Introduction
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) require contractors operating biocontainment facilities to do the following:
• Develop a site-specific incident response plan for biological emergencies that complies with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) rules (CFR 2005; 2005a) and their own site-specific emergency management requirements. • Develop and participate in a biological safety program (CFR, 2006) that establishes an institutional biosafety committee or equivalent to review: Ʌ Any work with biological etiologic agents and ensure it complies with applicable federal, state, and local regulations; Ʌ Site-specific security, safeguards, and emergency management plans and procedures and ensure they adequately consider the work involving the biological etiologic agents (with particular emphasis on biological select agents).
DOE/NNSA require all contractors to develop and participate in an emergency management program. DOE/NNSA also require contractors operating biocontainment facilities that store or support activities involving biological select agents and toxins (contractors can also apply this approach to other etiologic agents and hazardous toxins) to: • Include the biocontainment facilities in their emergency management program; • Analyze the biological hazards; • Document analysis results in facility-specific emergency planning hazards assessments (EPHAs); • Implement the biological aspects of a hazardous materials program. DOE/NNSA emergency management programs are developed, coordinated, controlled, and directed in accordance with DOE Order (O) 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System. DOE O 151.1C establishes requirements for emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response activities and describes the approach to effectively integrate these activities under a comprehensive, all-hazard concept. DOE/ NNSA emergency management programs ensure DOE and the contractor can respond promptly, effectively, and efficiently to protect workers, the public, and the environment. DOE/NNSA emergency management programs are designed to ensure: all emergencies are promptly recognized and categorized/classified; emergencies are reported and notifications are made; onsite protective actions (PAs) are implemented; offsite PA recommendations are made, as appropriate; and parameters associated with emergencies are monitored to detect changed or degraded conditions. DOE Guide (G) 151.1-5, Emergency Management Guide, Biosafety Facilities provides guidance to develop an emergency management program that addresses the range of biological incident scenarios that contractors should consider in emergency/ incident response planning. DOE/NNSA emergency management programs implement a structured readiness assurance program that consists of evaluations (plans, procedures, preparedness activities, and response performance), continuous improvement (corrective actions and lessons learned), and documented assessments. The readiness assurance program ensures that emergency plans, implementing procedures, and resources are adequate and sufficiently maintained, exercised, and evaluated. Improvements are made in response to identified needs. Exercise evaluations represent an essential component of the readiness assurance program evaluation element.
Biocontainment facility exercises are based on facility-specific hazards and EPHA results. The exercises demonstrate and test incident response planning and the integration of hazardous biological release response with the site-level emergency management program. DOE exercise programs incorporate a rigorous methodology to conduct and evaluate exercises, which reflects a structured and documented process to validate and improve DOE/NNSA emergency management programs. The conduct and evaluation of exercises at a DOE/NNSA biocontainment facility to demonstrate and test biological incident response planning using the rigorous DOE methodology is illustrated in this article using information from recent exercises at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) biocontainment facilities.
annual drills or exercises to test the planned response to emergency situations contained in the facility's incident response plan. The required contents of an incident response plan are described briefly in Select Agent Rules in terms of various emergency management-related issues. Issues may include the identity/quantity of material released; notifications; lines of authority and communication; planning and coordination with local emergency responders; site security plan; and PAs such as evacuation, decontamination procedures, and procedures that employees performing rescue or medical duties follow. Select Agent Rules specify notifications that the facility must make if an agent or toxin causes an occupational exposure or is released in the facility.
The development of DOE/NNSA emergency management programs for biological hazards takes advantage of both existing site-wide programs for radioactive materials and toxic chemicals and the requirements of Select Agent Rules. Program additions and modifications to account for biological hazards reflect the fundamental concepts of DOE emergency management. The three underlying concepts identified below strongly influence the basic planning and response methodology for any hazardous materials release in DOE programs: 1. Effective response is the last line of defense against adverse consequences. Ʌ If biosafety controls fail, the facility should be prepared to take actions to limit or prevent adverse health and safety impacts to workers and the public. 2. Planning, preparedness, and response must be specific to and commensurate with the hazards. Ʌ Specific planning, preparedness, and response measures must be tailored to each biological hazard. 3. Early recognition is vital to timely, effective response. Ʌ Early recognition of a biological release event is essential for delivery of warnings in time to effectively execute PAs.
Biological releases can represent major events that threaten workers, the public, and the environment. The DOE emergency management system defines an operational emergency (OE) as a major abnormal event that requires the planned response of a DOE/NNSA emergency management program. The term differentiates major OE events from emergency response to worker safety events, which generally do not require full emergency management response. An OE specifically associated with a release from a DOE biocontainment facility is defined as any actual or potential release of a hazardous biological agent/toxin outside the secondary barriers of the biocontainment area.
DOE/NNSA emergency management programs address various functions and activities that implement and maintain the capability to respond to OEs. If hazardous materials are present in sufficient quantities to threaten the health and safety of collocated workers and the public, or the environment, a hazardous materials program is required.
The emergency management functions and activities of a hazardous materials program are divided into the following four components: 1. Planning (e.g., EPHA, emergency plans and procedures); 2. Preparedness (i.e., program administration, training, and exercises); 3. Readiness assurance (i.e., evaluations, corrective actions, lessons learned); 4. Response (e.g., emergency response organization (ERO), offsite response interfaces, emergency categorization, consequence assessment, PAs, emergency public information).
For a biocontainment facility, these program functions and activities are commensurate with the hazards and developed based on facility-specific EPHA results. The integration of biological hazards with the existing site emergency plan requires some modifications in emergency management functions to account for unique aspects of emergency response to a release of hazardous biological materials. DOE G 151.1-5 outlines essential elements for DOE/ NNSA biocontainment facility emergency response, including: • An ERO, including a responsible official; • Offsite interfaces, including federal, tribal, state, and local agencies to include first responders; • Personnel protective equipment (PPE) and other emergency equipment available such that emergency responders are prepared to deal with a hazardous biological release; • Established recognition criteria or indicators to promptly determine if an incident is an actual or potential biological release to the environment and criteria to categorize an OE; • Mechanism for prompt, accurate, and effective emergency notifications to workers, EROs, and appropriate external agencies and authorities; • Provisions to assess onsite and offsite consequences of a potential or an actual biological hazard release; • Preplanning for initial PAs and re-entry;
• Provisions for emergency medical support; • Accurate, candid, and timely release of emergency public information relating to the release.
DOE/NNSA Exercise Programs for Biocontainment Facilities
Select Agent Rules require contractors to conduct exercises at least annually to test and evaluate the effectiveness of a biocontainment facility's incident response plan. DOE O 151.1C also requires contractors to validate all elements of their emergency management program over a multi-year (5-year) period through a formal exercise program. A contractor annually exercises the emergency response capability of a biocontainment facility and that includes at least a facility-level evaluation and critique. As part of a site̻level emergency management program, the contractor conducts an annual biocontainment facility building evacuation exercise and tests the facility's communication systems at least annually. For multiple-facility sites, the contractor should include the biocontainment facility as the basis for its annual site exercise, in its turn, as part of the rotation among facilities, to test and demonstrate integration of the biocontainment facility's response to hazardous biological releases with the site-level emergency management program.
DOE G 151.1-3, Exercises, describes the role of an exercise program in validating facility-and site-level emergency management program elements by initiating response to simulated, realistic emergency events/ conditions that replicate an integrated emergency response to an actual event as nearly as possible. An exercise program for biocontainment facilities is based on facility-specific hazards and addresses two generic types of scenarios, observed and unobserved releases. The scenarios should involve onsite emergency response personnel, including medical personnel, and if possible, offsite community medical personnel and public health officials. DOE O 151.1C requires the contractor to invite offsite response organizations to participate in facility/ site exercises once every 3 years. However, in the case of biological releases, the essential role of offsite responders suggests it is desirable that offsite responders participate in the exercises more frequently.
Exercise planning and preparation use a structured approach that includes establishing an exercise planning team that documents the exercise purpose, scope, specific objectives, scenario, timeline, message injects, controller/evaluator instructions, and evaluation criteria. Exercises are conducted, controlled, and critiqued to include gathering and documenting participant observations, and evaluated. Corrective actions identified in the critique/evaluation process are incorporated into the emergency management program. After an exercise or actual incident, the emergency plan/procedures are reviewed and revised, as necessary.
Exercise Director
The exercise director is a member of the exercise planning team and plans and prepares for conducting and formally evaluating an exercise. The exercise director presents exercise scenario information to the players and, in concert with controllers, controls exercise activities to include stopping and restarting the response, when appropriate. The exercise director, in concert with evaluators, observes player actions to evaluate them against exercise objectives. After the exercise is terminated, the exercise director conducts formal evaluation meetings and identifies lessons learned and corrective actions resulting from the exercise critique and evaluation. The exercise director documents exercise results in an exercise-after-action report (AAR) and ensures exercise records are developed and retained.
Exercise Planning Team
An exercise planning team assists the exercise director with exercise planning, conduct, critique, and evaluation as well as developing the AAR. An exercise planning team is comprised of the exercise director, representatives from involved DOE and contractor organizations, and representatives from participating federal, state, tribal, and local agencies. Team members should have the authority and capability to commit and coordinate the necessary resources from their respective organizations.
In addition to the above-identified exercise planning team members, the exercise planning team for an INL biocontainment facility exercise includes the following: The exercise planning team may, depending on the exercise size and scope, group team members into subteams to perform various functions. A sub-team is generally established to develop the full exercise scenario using established guidelines.
Exercise Participants
Exercise participants include those who respond (players), control (controllers), and evaluate (evaluators) an exercise and may include those who add realism for responders by playing specific roles (actors) and observe the exercise (observers) as follows: • Players-Actual responders, including biocontainment laboratory staff, ERO members, and on-and offsite organizations. Participate in exercise critiques. • Controllers-Provide overall exercise direction and control and ensure safe and effective exercise conduct, ensuring player/responder behavior remains within predefined boundaries and all activities are executed within a safe environment. Participate in exercise critiques and evaluations.
• Evaluators-Subject-matter experts who observe, monitor, and formally evaluate player and controller performance against specified exercise objectives. Participate in exercise critiques and evaluations. • Actors-Simulate personnel who responders would actually encounter if the scenario was real and evoke player reactions. May come in face-to-face contact with www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 16, No. 1, 2011 responders or be members of a control cell. May function as media reporters, interested public requesting information regarding an event, next-of-kin, or victims/ injured personnel. For realism, if functioning as victims/ injured personnel, they may wear makeup and "act" injured, unconscious, hysterical, or dead-whatever the scenario calls for.
• Observers-May be present for official and/or educational purposes. Located so as not to interfere or be a safety risk at any time. Do not interact with players/ responders.
Exercise Plan Development
An exercise plan documents all planning and preparation activities to conduct and evaluate an exercise. It consists of several components that address the exercise purpose; scope, including players and their extent of play, limitations/simulations, type of weather used, safety and security; objectives with formal demonstration criteria and points of review for evaluation; scenario; timeline of key scenario events; message injects; and rules of conduct.
The exercise purpose states the requirement for conducting the exercise, which is usually to meet the DOE O 151.1C requirement to conduct an annual exercise. The purpose may also include other requirements for conducting the exercise based on the number and types of participants. For example, the purpose may include requirements of offsite participants who are participating in the exercise.
The exercise scope identifies the organizations and agencies participating in the exercise, the extent of their participation (full, limited, or simulated by a controller), other simulations, weather (real or simulated), and safety and security considerations.
Exercise objectives are the basis for developing a meaningful and challenging exercise scenario. Objectives have formal demonstration criteria and points of review for exercise evaluators to gauge or measure performance of the response capabilities of participating organizations. INL has established 17 standardized objectives to cover a wide variety of facilities as identified below. For a recent INL biocontainment facility exercise, 10 of the INL standardized objectives were selected and one was added for demonstration (Table 1) .
The exercise scenario is based on the expected scope and objectives. A unique exercise scenario is used to preclude participant anticipation of the event and ensure a valid test of the players. The scenario is the se- 
Other Objectives
Response of affected laboratory personnel X quential information that identifies and details an emergency event, timing of specific activities, expected player responses, and related data. Simulation of responses is minimized and realism emphasized. Sufficient activities are included to allow players the opportunity to demonstrate the specific objectives for evaluation. These components are tied to probable incidents involving biohazardous materials, including those that might be considered catastrophic, or maximum credible events. DOE G 151.1-5, Appendix A, Operational Emergency Scenarios for Biosafety Facilities, lists eight scenarios, ranging from common laboratory accidents (e.g., tube breakage during centrifugation) to malevolent acts by insiders. INL used these scenarios as starting points to develop biocontainment facility incident response plans. Exercise scenarios for INL biocontainment facilities are tailored to consider actual facility-specific biological hazards.
For a recent INL biocontainment facility exercise, the scenario involved an explosion in a mock biocontainment laboratory with potential for both biological and chemical releases (Figure 1) . Players responded. The exercise director and controllers controlled exercise conduct (Figure 2) . A fringe group immediately claimed responsibility. First responders (Idaho Falls Fire Department) requested support from the regional hazardous material team (Figures 3 and 4) . The State of Idaho requested assistance from the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) (Figures 5 and 6 ). Federal law enforcement involvement 
Figure 3
INL biological facility exercise-Idaho Falls Fire Department and regional hazardous material team on-scene with responder vehicles.
Figure 4
INL biological facility exercise-Responders in PPE; interagency exercises may reveal differences in PPE selection. was simulated. Offsite exposure was modeled and evacuations were considered. A recovery team was established and the exercise was concluded.
A master sequence of events list (timeline of key scenario events) details expected key events and response, identifies message injects, and identifies the approximate times key events, response, and message injects are expected to occur.
Message injects provide information that controllers give to players at certain times during the exercise in order to see expected actions. Message injects include instructions to controllers to begin simulations or insert information, acting instructions, and contingency messages. They may include maps, diagrams, or schematics and data such as patient vital signs or a description of injuries. Controllers give message injects only after a player has performed the necessary actions to earn the inject. Message injects also provide for contingencies. If after a reasonable time a player does not perform a key step to demonstrate an objective, a controller gives the player a contingency message inject that requires the player to perform the key step. Play continues and the controller and evaluator note the player's initial failure to perform the key step.
Player, controller, evaluator, actor, and observer rules of conduct are guidelines established to conduct the exercise that include administrative limitations (management policies and guidelines of concern); protocols that remind participants of drillsmanship and safety issues; and exercise simulations (e.g., predetermined meteorological data, road blocks, use of protective equipment). Players, controllers, evaluators, actors, and observers are provided with and briefed on the rules of conduct prior to the exercise and their responsibilities.
The briefing also includes answers to questions and discussion on any last-minute changes to the exercise and clarifications.
Exercise Control
Exercise participants conduct the exercise according to the exercise plan. The exercise director, in concert with controllers, controls exercise activities to include stopping and restarting the response, when appropriate. The exercise director can suspend or terminate the exercise at any time for any of the following conditions: • Players successfully reach the appropriate termination point, consistent with the exercise purpose, scope, and objectives; • The exercise deviates to the extent that the objectives cannot be adequately demonstrated; • A real event/alarm occurs during the exercise such that continuation is not practical.
Exercise Evaluation
Exercise evaluation is a two-part process. First, lead controllers conduct player critiques immediately following exercise termination. Controllers and evaluators then meet to complete the formal exercise evaluation.
During player critiques, controllers and evaluators encourage players to comment on problems encountered while performing their tasks during the exercise and report areas that were demonstrated exceptionally well. A key step in conducting critiques is reminding players that critiques are not problem-solving activities. Critiques are to identify positive actions or problem areas.
Both controllers and evaluators attend the formal Figure 5 INL biological facility exercise-National Guard WMD CST mobile laboratory. National assets distributed around the United States provide unique capabilities to support civilian emergencies.
Figure 6
INL biological facility exercise-National Guard WMD CST command post.
Command post includes integrated communication capabilities. evaluation meeting. Controllers generally do not evaluate the exercise, but may have information on why actions were or were not performed that the evaluators may not have seen. Objective demonstration criteria and points of review in each area of play are discussed in detail. After the formal evaluation meeting, evaluators write a paragraph or more on how each objective observed was or was not demonstrated, detailing both positive and problem areas. Evaluators provide this information to the exercise director to include in the AAR.
Exercise-After-Action Report (AAR)
The exercise director develops a formal AAR and subsequently submits the report to DOE. The AAR includes the following: • Exercise type and purpose; • List of participating organizations/agencies; • Summary of the scenario; • List of exercise objectives (and whether they were or were not demonstrated); • Specific commentary on each objective, including observations, lessons learned, and any recommended corrective actions; • Summary of exercise results.
An effective AAR identifies observations, lessons learned, and recommended corrective actions. Afteraction reports for recent INL biocontainment facility exercises identified the following: • The National Guard WMD CST gave additional analytical capability to characterize the biological release. The National Guard WMD CST was highly trained and equipped. Working with local responders, the National Guard WMD CST and regional State of Idaho hazardous material team gave local responders the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their capabilities and strengthened the communication that will be necessary during future training or actual events. • Additional decontamination equipment was needed for the biocontainment laboratory and that equipment should be stored outside the laboratory area. The recommended corrective action was implemented, verified, and validated during the next exercise for the biocontainment facility.
Conclusions
Evaluation of formalized annual exercises at INL biocontainment facilities has provided meaningful improvements to facility-specific biosafety, security, and incident response plans and procedures that comply with select agent regulations and ensure safe work and safeguarding of select agents and toxins. Exercise evaluations also provided meaningful improvements to the INL Emergency Management Program. The formality of emergency planning required by DOE O 151.1C and implementation of comprehensive emergency management programs at DOE/NNSA facilities may be useful for other entities to consider as they prepare or update their incident response plans for work with select agents.
